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BOOK REVIEW
Man and Nature: Selected Essays by Giorgio Del Vecchio
Edited by Ralph A. Newman, translated by A. H. Campbell;
pp. 197; University of Notre Dame Press, Notre
Dame, Indiana (1969); $9.00.
For the law student and the practicing attorney, editor Newman
has compiled an interesting and representative group of Giorgio Del
Vecchio's essays. However, for the serious student of legal philosophy,
the selection is sketchy, and other than for the beauty of the translation, and the occasional poetic ascendency of Del Vecchio, such a
diverse, un-coordinated set of essays does a disservice to the legal
philosophy of Del Vecchio.
The legal student must recognize that Del Vecchio is a philosopher,
and therefore, he places "the law" in context with his other ideas or
categories. Within the examples given in this selection, the most pertinent and notable are "The Homo Juridicus and the Inadequacy of
'2
Law As A Norm of Life"' and "Truth In Morality And Law."
Much well focused criticism has been forthcoming on the nature
and scope of book reviews, largely because the author must, by the
very nature of the composition, choose to recite the contents of the book
with appropriate descriptive comments, or insert an abundance of new
material as commentary, the opportunity for self-expression overriding
the desire to be informative about the publication under discussion.
One cannot escape the trap of such a definitional criticism, as it merely
admits of the problem of communication: the revelatory and confessional nature of our utterances, which must of necessity be impressed
without from the ego within, and the semantic inadequacy of intersubjectivity between persons. Unabashed by the hazards of the task,
alerting the reader to the problem involved may in some small measure
allow others to rise to a level of independent questioning, which philosophically would be the soundest approach.
In the area of law, stepping ahead of the formulary area from which
no philosophy ever seems to adequately rise, Del Vecchio has made a
real and substantial contribution to the establishment of rules or standards by which the juridical personality can be measured. 3 The essay,
"The Homo Juridicus And The Inadequacy Of Law As A Norm of
Life," 4 written in 1935, is a discussion of the legal personality in the
same framework as similar hypothetical figures discussed with relation
to economics, religion, or any other single motive. The need for a more
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realistic and systematized definition of the juridical personality in
Anglo-American law has been recognized by others,5 and the area of
torts is such a branch of law. As Professor Prosser has struggled in
the Restatement of Torts 6 to define negligence in terms of categorical
imperatives, that is, that the duty is imposed upon the subject's will
in such a way as to prevent escape, the areas of facultative or permissive
duties are confused or omitted, as they are clumsy or embarrassing
problems to a system predicated upon sociological idealism. Although
the editor would have us believe that Del Vecchio "kindled into flame
the flickering embers of natural law,"17 a close analysis would seem to
buttress Professor Friedmann's classification of idealism s and it finds
a clear reflection in the rather classic, Neo-Hegelian essay, "On The
State-Character Of Law" (1928), in which Del Vecchio finds the hope
of a valid system of State-Law in this summary sentence:
A State fully lives and prospers only when, besides the formal
nexus which unites participants in the same juridical order, there
is also an ethical bond, a profound identity of wills, a real communion of spirits, and an equal ardor of faith in the civil religion of the fatherland.9
Of course, natural law is subject to many definitions.' 0 In relation to
natural law as dependent upon the Divine Order as set forth by St.
Thomas Aquinas, 1 Del Vecchio is not a natural law philosopher. If
we extend the category of natural law to such later philosophies as
Rousseau, Locke, Hobbes and Mr. Justice Black's characterization of
the majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court, we might
5See F. HARPER & F. JAMxEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1 n.4 and 5 (1956).
6 "The word 'act' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote

an external manifestation of the actor's will and does not include any of its
results, even the most direct, immediate, and intended."
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"In the Restatement of this Subject, negligence is conduct which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful
of an interest of others." RFSTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
Del Vecchio has previously made the argument that juridical personality is
comprised of both liability for our acts and non-acts, if the latter are defined

as the conscious refraining to do which has no external manifestation.
Dean Prosser's definitions would cover act and omissions to act, if a legal
duty exists. However, his definition contains a predicate that perception
(actual or objective) occurs. In order to render an individual liable he must
then be actually or socially accountable. But neither Prosser nor Del Vecchio
states a moral premise upon which accountability has its source. Ergo, one
must have a positive law announcement of liability or duty to perceive and
we cannot have individual liability except in those cases in which positive
morality has reached the level of State-law, and this by its very nature is
contradictory to a valid system of individually posited perception.
7 DEL VECCHxO, supra note 1, at ix.
8 W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 186 (5th ed. 1967).
9 DEL VECCHIO,supra note 1, at 151.
10 FRIEDMANN, supra note 8, at 104-56.

11 Id at 107.
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place Del Vecchio within the modern stream of rational idealism, his
system premised upon reason and spirit relied upon as an a priori part
12

of "law" but unarticulated in terms of ontology.
The essay on "Truth and Morality In Law"1 " is an exceptionally
valid and timely statement of the interplay of ethics( the absolute good),
positive morality (social norms recognized but without any state-enforced sanction) and law (in the general Austinian concept of commands of the sovereign). Although the essay is not exhaustive of the
interrelationship of ethics, positive morality and law, because the concept of ethics is without religious foundation and hence subject to the
inherent solipsistic error of all idealism, the fact of the socio-economic
complexities of legal change within the cultural framework of national
states is well conceptualized. Perhaps one could not fully appreciate
' 14
this essay without also reading "The Crisis of The Science of Law,
both statements being pertinent to the laments of Mr. Justice Black, 15
6
and the Freirechtslehre
of modern authors and activists to desert the
legislative forum for the judicial forum in order to promulgate new
private rights.
Whether one agrees or disagrees, the essays are worth reading, the
translation elegant and the editorial selection broadly representative of
one of the world's acknowledged philosophers; whose attempts to explain truth have spanned the twentieth century.
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15 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947).
16 "These are not the only symptoms of the modern tendency to depreciate
legislation as a source of law. There is, for instance, that complex of doctrines and ideals which is called 'the school of free law.' This school maintains that the formal reference the judge makes to the text of the law is
scarcely more than a fiction, and that in reality he depends for his solution
upon a direct examination of the case and a balancing of the conflicting interests involved." G. DEL VECCHIO, MAN AND NATURE 175-76 1969).
Professor Friedmann makes a similar comment to the school of Freirechtslehre; see FRIEDMANN, supra note 8, at 342-44; see also R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JusTicE (1969).

